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Abstract 
 
Nonviolence has an established tradition in several disciplines, 
including political theory, international relations and political 
science. We explore the potential of nonviolence as analytical 
and normative framework for the study of European integration 
and European Union (EU) politics. At the outset, we introduce 
the basics of nonviolence and define our approach to this 
concept. We then apply it to three critical issues concerning the 
nature of EU power, the democratic deficit and the narrative of 
integration. We find that our framework re-defines the core 
dimensions of the problems of power and democracy, assists in 
imagining the EU in non state-morphic ways, and provides 
innovative ways to put praxis at the roots of the integration 
process and its narrative. 
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WHAT’S NONVIOLENCE TO DO WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION? 
 
Roberto Baldoli and Claudio M. Radaelli 
 
1. Introduction 
The European Union (EU) is experiencing deep discontinuity – a critical juncture in the 
language of political science. It is not just a matter of institutional and policy 
performance, it is the overall project of European integration as we know it that is under 
pressure. In this challenging context, however, the EU has also shown resiliency. 
Whatever position one takes on the critical juncture facing the EU, the so-called ‘crisis 
of the integration project’ is actually an ecology of the following issues. 
Firstly, there are fundamental questions of power as capacity for purposeful action and 
capacity to influence the behavior of other players in a way consistent with one’s 
preferences. The EU seems incapable of producing the power needed to solve acute 
political puzzles and policy dilemmas as well as incapable of generating sufficient 
legitimacy for this power when a goal is achieved. Consider how the EU institutions 
have tackled until now migration, foreign policy, and the promotion of peace and 
human rights - outside and inside its member states: no-one can detect a distinctive and 
unambiguous capacity and quality (that is, power for what final goals) of this power.   
The second critical issue in the ‘crisis’ landscape is democracy. Of course, this topic has 
its own connection with the issue of power – after all they belong to an ecology of 
issues as we mentioned. But in recent years the long-standing problem of the 
democratic deficit has become compounded by the fact that democracy as praxis and 
project is under attack in member states. This is shown by the debate on democratic 
backsliding (Kelemen and Blauberger, 2017)– thus the multi-level challenge for 
democracy is twofold. Democratic theorists have looked into new frameworks like 
demo(i)cracy that evokes new ways forward for the democratization project within the 
context of multi-level governance (Nicolaïdis, 2013). However, this healthy debate 
among democratic theorists has not percolated into a set of feasible political steps and 
messages that could be communicated with clarity to the citizens of the EU.  
The third issue is about ‘the’ narrative. It opens up the question of ‘European integration 
for what?’ Indeed, this is the teleological question on the finalité of integration. True, 
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there have been periods of time in which the EU has thrived with pragmatism and 
incrementalism exactly by avoiding this hard question. In the current context however, 
the narratives of disintegration, Brexit and wrong policies produced by the technocrats 
sitting at the European Commission, so popular among citizens, have to be balanced by 
a narrative that shows where the EU is headed, assuming we can manage to fix it. The 
European Commission has a website dedicated to the search of a new narrative for 
Europe (Barroso, 2013). In the world of political science, there has been an 
intensification of studies on policy narratives, myths and historically situated national 
discourses on integration (Manners and Murray, 2016; Lacroix and Nicolaïdis, 2010). 
Deep down, this third issue uncovers the problem of connecting resiliency, the policy 
responses to economic and monetary problems in the Euro area, and the negotiations 
over Brexit to a set of causal ideas that resonate in the minds of citizens as proper 
historical project. During its founding years, the EU had a historical project of sorts: it 
centred on peace. Yet, what is the historical narrative today? 
Given this compounded nature of ‘the crisis’, it is not surprising that a leading journal 
like Journal of Common Market Studies has made at least two recent attempts to capture 
the theoretical nature of this discontinuity. In one case with a special issue on the 
conventional wisdom(s) under challenge (vol.52/6), in another with a collection of 
papers illustrating dissenting, critical, silenced theoretical voices on Europe and 
integration (vol.54/1).  
Encouraged by these efforts to widen the peripheral vision of integration scholars, we 
contribute to the debate by suggesting a new research agenda. Nonviolence is the new 
lens we deploy to observe the EU and draw lessons. More precisely, we deploy 
nonviolence as analytical and normative framework. We first explain our approach to 
the concept of nonviolence, then introduce some stylized facts pointing to the presence 
of nonviolence within the EU. A presence that has not yet been noticed by the 
community of social scientists in the field of EU studies. One caveat to bear in mind is 
that in this contribution we do not talk of nonviolence as theory or, even more 
specifically, theory of integration – at this stage, as we explain in section 2, it is 
sufficient to consider nonviolence as framework. 
We claim that as soon as we adopt nonviolence as a framework, or lens, these facts gain 
coherence and reveal important trajectories of integration. Further, we apply our 
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framework to the ecology of issues we have described: power (section 3), democracy 
(section 4) and narrative (section 5). Within the context of power, nonviolence sheds 
light on the ambiguous and ultimately flawed connection between power and violence. 
It is nonviolence, not violence, that produces the type of power that may best serve the 
EU of today and tomorrow. The nonviolent approach to power goes beyond people’s 
power and refocuses on the power of each individual, but it also connects the individual, 
its moral responsibility, and society. This brings us to democracy: here nonviolence 
points towards omni-cracy, the power of all. Put differently, the nonviolent vision heads 
towards an infinitely open society with its own forms of accountability. With regards to 
the narrative for Europe, nonviolence, perhaps to the surprise of some of our readers, 
does not offer its own teleology, grand narrative or ideal. In terms of final outcomes, it 
is silent. Yet, the nonviolent narrative of the EU offers an approach to the history of 
integration that is attractive. In the conclusion, we reflect on the implications of this 
research agenda and its connections with theories of integration.  
 
2. A concept and a framework 
The aim of this contribution is to introduce a new research agenda anchored to 
nonviolence and show how our framework grapples with the three issues of power, 
democracy and narrative. Before we can do that we firstly have to define the concept of 
nonviolence. The first step in constructing a concept is often the demarcation between 
the concept we have in mind and what the concept is not – otherwise we stretch the 
concept. 
Thus, what is definitively NOT nonviolence? Conceptually, nonviolence is not the 
opposite of violence nor is it pacifism (Jahanbegloo, 2014; Prabhu and Rao, 1996; 
Atack, 2012). This is the reason why in specialised literature the term is often spelled 
nonviolence instead of non-violence. There is a triadic relationship between violence, 
nonviolence and cowardice. If the choice is between addressing something bad with a 
violent action or not doing anything, it is better to choose violence, because doing 
nothing means that there will be harm. In these cases doing nothing is cowardice 
(Prabhu and Rao, 1996). It follows that nonviolence is more than the pure absence of 
violence – physical or other. Nonviolence is a force that assists individual and political 
communities in their search for stable solutions to conflict. This force is grounded in the 
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acknowledgement of the consequences of our actions. It follows Karma yoga, or selfless 
action, the practice taught by Krishna to Arjuna in the third book of the Bhagavad Gita. 
Physically responding to an act of evil may or may not be the best response, violence is 
of secondary importance in karma yoga. What matters is the karma of our action – the 
“spiritual or ethically operational residue of every act” (Nagler, 2007: 311) - whether we 
are trying to get some immediate benefit or we are acting responsibly towards the 
implications of our actions for others and for the future.  
The concept of nonviolence is all about yoga – hence action. It is not a doctrine about 
moral superiority or what is good or bad. The only condition is selfless action. Gandhi 
preferred the term ahimsa, which means non-harm or non-injury ‘to all living things in 
thought, word and deed’ (Atack, 2012: 5). Yet, In Sanskrit ahimsa does not have a 
negative connotation – like nonviolence has, being introduced by the prefix ‘non’. It 
means action: “none can renounce action out of a foolish attempt to avoid harm” 
(Klausen, 2014: 183). For our purposes, the best translation of ahimsa is ‘the force 
unleashed when the desire to harm is eradicated’1. Ahimsa is therefore a force that some 
of us could immediately consider a form of power, especially due to the political turn 
given to its meaning by Gandhi.  
Indeed, Arendt (Arendt, 1970) argued that the opposite of violence is power – she does 
not refer to nonviolence in her analysis of violence. In a sense this chimes with what we 
are saying about nonviolence. In fact, nonviolence produces power, being selfless action 
that takes into account the consequences of doing or not doing something for stable 
conflict resolution. This is the power of one – what Nagler calls ‘person power’ (Nagler, 
2014). Person power occurs when a mind becomes independent and refuses to be 
obedient to unjust legal or social norms. The power of many – what Gene Sharp would 
call ‘people power’ (Sharp, 1973), occurs when citizens wage nonviolent conflict 
together.  Incidentally, this shows the radical difference between a pacifist and a 
nonviolent mind. For the former the absolute value is peace. For the latter nonviolent 
conflict has a prominent role. 
Having defined the concept– with apologies to specialised readers who are aware of the 
colossal literature on nonviolence – we will now explain what nonviolence has to do 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See	  the	  definition	  of	  ahimsa	  provided	  by	  the	  Metta	  Center:	  http://mettacenter.org/definitions/gloss-­‐
concepts/ahimsa/	  (last	  accessed	  on	  the	  12	  June	  2017).	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with our contribution. We are aware of the debates around the meanings of terms like 
ontology, theory, and framework (Carstensen, 2012; Stanley, 2012). We cannot possibly 
engage with this debate given our word allowance. Therefore, we make a simple claim: 
that nonviolence is an analytical and normative framework can and indeed should be 
applied to the EU. Analytically, this framework allows us to see some empirical 
processes of European integration under a new light – this is why before we used the 
metaphor of the lens. Exactly because we adopt this lens, we can see processes that 
otherwise would be neglected by other lenses, and we can associate a precise meaning 
to these processes. Given these limited purposes, we do not need to compare 
nonviolences with other lenses and with theories of integration – these tasks can be 
usefully left to future contributions in the field. Thus, to clarify one more time, we are 
not saying that nonviolence is better than this or that theory, but we still claim that it is a 
feasible and productive way to approach to EU and in particular the three problems of 
power, democracy and teleology. 
Nonviolence as used here is thus an analytical framework: we use it to analyse and 
capture empirical dynamics within a coherent meaning. This is not a theory in the sense 
of providing causal explanations that one thing happens as a result of another thing 
occurring. In this respect, nonviolence is different from integration theories that explain 
why member states pull sovereignty and build certain institutions that generate a set of 
outcomes. We do not make claims of a causal nature. 
As well as an analytical framework, nonviolence has also a normative quality. We 
hasten to say that the normative dimension is not a catalogue of what ought to be. Its 
normative core arises out of beliefs in human nature and reality. The ontology of the 
homo nonviolentus, being grounded in karma yoga, is different from the ontology of the 
homo oeconomicus. This brings in normative statements about appropriate action. The 
aim of these normative propositions is to add to, to contribute to, to integrate a complex 
reality where change is the main characteristic.  
So what does nonviolence add to an unstable reality? It adds a phronesis, an evolving 
practical wisdom which does not quite separate ‘is’ from ‘ought to’(Mantena, 2012a; 
Mantena, 2012b), built on past and present successes and defeats. In the end, we draw 
on nonviolence to develop explanations and ways of approaching the critical issues – 
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not to justify a philosophical mind-set. This is the limitation of our contribution, but 
hopefully also its strength. 
 
3. Nonviolence and Europe 
As mentioned, the objective of our contribution is not to publish a succinct handbook of 
nonviolence 1.01 and show to the readers its tools and applications. We hope that with 
the minimal conceptual background we have introduced we will be able to tackle 
directly the three issues of power, democracy and narratives. Before we do that, we 
need to justify the claim that nonviolence adds and integrates phenomena that already 
exist within the EU. The point is that without nonviolence-as-framework, we cannot 
recognise their importance and meaning. 
Indeed, we do not need to make the abstract case for nonviolence because nonviolence 
has already been present in the deep forces that led to integration in Europe. Neglected 
as it may have been, nonviolent practice has been a pillar of the European struggle for 
democracy for a long time. Even the war of liberation fought within the wider context of 
World War II has important strands of nonviolence. Europe, indeed, provides endless 
examples of civil resistance to the Nazi and fascist dictatorships (Sémelin, 1993). For 
instance, Danish citizens engaged in nonviolent struggle by non-cooperation with the 
Nazis until the end of the war (Ackerman and Kruegler, 1994). Norwegian teachers 
resisted heroically against the Nazi takeover of education. The German women of 
Rosenstrasse managed to free their Jewish husbands from the Gestapo, preventing their 
deportation. A peasant, named Franz Jagerstatter from a small Austrian village, is now 
celebrated as a hero because he refused to take-up arms for the dictatorship, paying with 
his life (Putz, 2009). There are many similar examples of nonviolent throughout Europe 
that historians keep discovering. 
After WWII, nonviolence developed in many different directions. Indeed, the work of 
many European intellectuals and activists2 went hand-in-hand with real nonviolent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Gandhian influence in Europe started already in the 1930s, when the philosopher Aldo Capitini emerged 
with his fully-fledged theory of nonviolence. In Spain, Gonzalo Arias (1926-2008) and Llorenç Vidal 
(1936) fought against Franco Dictatorship. Arias went to prison for a petition for free elections; for 
defending conscientious objection, denouncing torture and opposing the politics of harrying against 
Gibraltar. Vidal founded the DENIP, the School Day of Nonviolence and Peace, and as “Ambassador of 
Peace”, spread a different and less-violent culture with actions and poetry. Lanza del Vasto and his Ark 
Communities proposed radical alternative ways of living together in many different countries. The work 
of the philosopher Jean-Marie Muller offered alternative ways to view education; and the historical 
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revolutions which freed several countries from authoritarian regimes, from Portugal to 
Czechoslovakia, from Poland to the Baltic States and Eastern Germany (Roberts and 
Garton Ash, 2009). Even in the darkness of the violence and ethnic cleansing of the 
Balkan war, nonviolence-as-practice resonated with its Sanskrit meaning of ‘force more 
powerful’ with the Otpor Movement that ousted Milosevich (Popovic, 2015), and with 
the struggle in Kosovo (Clark, 2015). A few years later, the nonviolent revolutionary 
spirit moved eastwards, in particular, to Georgia and the Ukraine. Arguably the most 
recent example is the Euromaidan Revolution of 2014 in which citizens died to remain 
anchored to the European project.  
It is in this sense that we claim that nonviolence has been one of the most resilient 
pillars of the construction of the European project. But the story is not limited to 
movements and civil resistance. It can also be seen within institutional history. In the 
last few decades, nonviolence entered into the official documents of the EU. Indeed,	  the	  
EP resolution of 8 May 2008 on the Annual Report on Human Rights in the World 2007 
argued that ‘nonviolence is the most appropriate means of ensuring that fundamental 
human rights are enjoyed, upheld, promoted and respected to the full’ (European 
Parliament, 2008). One year later, the report ‘Nonviolent Civic Action in Support of 
Human Rights and Democracy’ expanded on the ways the European Union can shape 
its external actions in a nonviolent way (European Parliament, 2009).  
There is of course a large amount of literature on the case studies we have described, 
covering individual countries like Serbia or the Ukraine. This field is generally known 
as civil resistance (Roberts and Garton Ash, 2009). Yet, even though some theorists of 
nonviolence have occasionally dealt with the implications for integration in Europe 
(Galtung, 1973), the literature is silent on what this neglected history means. This is our 
task for the next three sections – to show how this stock of nonviolence tackles the 
critical issues that make up the crisis of integration.  
 
4. Civilian Power Europe as Self-Rule 
The chronic lack of power at the European level has been worsened by recent critical 
events. We argue that the problem is the dominant conception of power as military 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
research by Semelin shed light on a different and less-violent past. Nonviolence also features in 
Catholicism, e.g. the work of Jean Goss and Hildegard Goss-Mayr, lobbying for conscientious objection 
during the Second Vatican Council and contributing to the International Fellowship of Reconciliation. 
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(Schilde, 2017; Howorth, 2017). This was yet again the key concern of the Rome 
Summit as expressed in point 4 of the Declaration, whereby strengthening its common 
security and defence is seen as critical in re-launching Europe within the world 
(European Council, 2017).   
The lack of a European army has definitely been an issue since the 1954 rejection of the 
European Defence Treaty. There is no doubt that there are paradoxes involved in not 
having an army (Giumelli and Cusumano, 2014).  
However, the reduction of power to ‘military power’ is questionable. The crisis 
situations in which the EU is called for action cannot be solved by the military alone. 
The hybrid war in the Ukraine; the attempts of democratisation of the Arab Spring; the 
migration crisis; and even terrorism. All of these require a more complex response, and 
a different kind of power. 
Nonviolent techniques, tactics and strategies are much more than simply a superior 
moral alternative to war, or even a functional substitute. They already represent the 
reality of modern conflicts. Nonviolent techniques are deployed by Russia in the Baltics 
(Radin, 2017) and Ukraine (Bartkowski, 2015), and by China in the South East China 
Sea (Bartkowski, 2015); in the processes of decolonisation and democratisation all 
around the world, from Western Sahara to Egypt, from Tunisia to Georgia; people are 
fighting ISIS non-violently (Popovic, 2016; Braley and Popovic, 2015); European 
countries like Lithuania rely on civil disobedience as way to defend the country 
(Miniotaite, 1996).  
These events are the sign that Europe has to deal with (and master) a different kind of 
power which is developing across nations. Here we see nonviolence bringing us to the 
roots of power. These roots lie in social and political relationships among human 
beings. Already, Gene Sharp observed the social quality of power. For this theorist of 
nonviolence, power is not a monolith. It is plural, and it “is always based upon an 
intricate and fragile structure of human and institutional relationships” (Sharp, 1980: 
24). There are many social loci of power: authority, human resources, skills and 
knowledge, intangible factors, material resources and sanctions. This certainly has 
limitations (Atack, 2012; Martin, 1989), but it brings attention to something other than 
military power. Another theorist of nonviolence, Iain Atack, argued that power is not a 
commodity or an entity to be seized, controlled, or even owned: it lies in human 
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relationships, in any social and political practice. Thus, changing any kind of unequal 
and oppressive social practice is changing and exercising power (Atack, 2012).  
Who are the key players in this more complex and diffuse approach to power? This 
links us to the second reduction of the present debate on the power of Europe: the 
reduction of power to ‘the power of institutions’ (whether European or national). 
Institutions are certainly fundamental but they produce effects via human agency. It is 
reductive to see them solely as the channel for Market Power Europe (Damro, 2012) or 
even Liberal Power Europe (Wagner, 2017). Following  Duchêne, institutions can serve 
the vision of ‘civilian power Europe’(Duchêne, 1973). Yet, Duchêne’s vision has 
captured the imagination of theorists of integration exactly because European 
institutions can influence other actors without military force. Less has been done on the 
civilian part of Duchêne’s programme. 
Yet again we need nonviolence to provide clarity on these ‘civilian’ qualities. For 
instance, Tewes, talking about Germany, introduced the idea that civilian means civil as 
non-state (Tewes, 2001). Civilian power includes democracy, it “refers to the rights of 
individuals and society vis-à-vis the state”, focusing on “rights, on legitimacy, and on 
the democratic values that come with them” (Tewes, 2001: 11). In 2006, Ian Manners, 
revising his own approach to normative power Europe, introduced what was missing 
from the 2002 article (Manners, 2002): the citizens. Unfortunately, he did not give free 
rein to the potential of such intuitions (Manners, 2006: 184)3. This chimes with the 
debate on civilian power Europe, where very rarely do we see civil resistance in a 
prominent position, or even mentioned (Roberts and Garton Ash, 2009: 6).  
Nonviolence starts from the granular power of agency, of any human being. Every 
human being holds an important and yet underestimated power in any social and 
political relationship: the power to say “no”. Power is therefore seen through the lenses 
of consent theory: the power of X in a community depends not on military endowment 
or law, but on the consent attributed to other members of the political community to X. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 He rightly noticed that Duchêne referred in his chapter to Marion Dönhoff, who was part of the German 
Resistance Movement and later civil activist, and to her idea of political peace (against nuclear peace), to 
“the way in which every day acts and cultural example help to transmute conflict into peace through civil 
activism and collective action” p. 185. Yet, there is much more than this. Duchêne used Marion 
Dönhoff’s phrase on political peace vs technical peace of nuclear. Yet, Marion is an example of much 
more. She fought against Nazism at university, for instance with leaflets, in a way that reminds of the 
Scholl brothers. She helped in the 1944 plot to assassinate Hitler, in the same group with Bonhoeffer. 
Later, she worked a lot for reconciliation between west and east, for peace. In other words, she represents 
that particular world which this article is trying to take into account. 
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This is ‘power of the powerless’ (Havel, 1985), but we can scale it up to an institutional 
level. All governments depend on the voluntary assistance, cooperation and obedience 
of their citizens (Sharp, 1973; Atack, 2012).  
This is not a new theory. La Boetie talked extensively about it already in the XVI 
century, in his Discourse on Voluntary Servitude. Yet, what has changed is the 
organisation, the potential and the consequences of this idea. The amount, quality of 
nonviolent handbooks, training and organizations on the ground has never been so high. 
The number and quality of techniques used to disobey has never been so effective. The 
number of regime changes is already impressive. And yet, populism is also grounded in 
the idea of giving back power to the people. However, as citizens can shake the 
foundation of any institutional project, they can also participate, monitor and support 
institutions that guarantee stable conflict resolution. 
The focus on consent and citizens leads us to the third reduction – power reduced to 
destruction (power over). But power can also be exchange (power with) and power to 
project values abroad. Since we cannot simply think that one day EU troops would have 
the same destructive power of, say, US troops, this raises the question of the aim of 
power. 
Some of our readers will be shocked by the granularity and basic simple truth of this 
statement, but for nonviolence the aim of power is to improve: to rise from passivity to 
freedom. Recall what we said about nonviolence ‘adds to’, hence it is constructive 
instead of destructive. This is with regards to a true change in rulership (Dallmayr, 
2017: 124), which would not immediately focus on creating a new institution. It creates 
a form of governance that Gandhi called swaraj, self-rule (Gandhi, 1997; Parel, 2016). 
Governance is learning to rule ourselves (within and without Europe), abolishing not so 
much external threats, but, more fundamentally, our internal impediments. The urgent 
issue is building up autonomous communities with new social and political practices; 
governance should be about empowering and connecting these communities. 
Institutions came at the end of this causal chain, not at the beginning. 
The above-mentioned 2008 EP report has the merit of linking nonviolence to rights and 
the liberation of individuals and communities (European Parliament, 2008). Yet, there is 
more. Using nonviolence as normative framework, we argue for a widening of our 
peripheral vision to diplomacy as ‘citizens’ or ‘multi-track diplomacy’ (Kavaloski, 
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1990), as well as diplomacy supporting civil resistance (Kinsman and Bassuener, 2008). 
Nonviolence offers a way to transform the very experience of waging conflict, enriching 
and changing the lives of those involved (Galtung, 1996). It supports a bottom-up 
perspective on fighting invasions (Sharp, 1985; Burrowes, 1996) and even terrorism 
(Ram and Summy, 2007; Popovic, 2016; Martin, 2002). It fosters a different quality of 
peacekeeping (Nagler, 1997) and offers socially-robust ways to build bridges between 
parties in conflict4. 
Indeed, someone has already written on the European Civilian Peace Corps5 (Barbiero, 
2011), an evolution of the Gandhian idea of a peace army, called Shanti Sena. This 
vision was first proposed by MEP Alexander Langer in 1994. Yet, 12 years later 
Manners realised that the attempt to build civilian organisations, such as the European 
Peacebuilding Agency and the European Civil Peace Corps, had been largely ignored 
(Manners, 2006: 189). 
We stress that the European Shanti Sena is only one aspect under the larger perspective. 
Europe has an enormous yet still undervalued power, the power of its citizens to end all 
the many internal quarrels and hatred, building up what Gandhi would have called 
swaraj, self-rule. This is the real ‘civilian power Europe’: the possibility of creating a 
self-determining Europe based on the daily exercise of people power by its citizens.  
This is not just a vision, it entails an alternative experience of power, with citizens at the 
centre, learning day by day to rule themselves. It is the learning exercise and the 
experience that François Mitterand evoked in his prophetic speech at the EP on 17 
January 1995. Mitterand spoke of liberating Europeans from the tyranny of their past, 
their prejudices and their history: “What I am asking you here is almost impossible, 
because we have to defeat our past. And yet, if we don’t defeat it, it must be known that 
the following rule will prevail, Ladies and Gentlemen: Nationalism is War!”. 
(http://audiovisual.europarl.europa.eu/Assetdetail.aspx?id=fa1f5f84-f323-40ce-8153-
dfe96bbeee67 )  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For instance, the EU is active in global health diplomacy. Health care diplomacy represents a powerful 
bridge between countries and people if its aim is to achieve the autonomy of people via infrastructures 
and networks.  
5 See the two feasibility studies on the establishment of ECPC: Robert P., Vilby, K., Aiolfi, L., and R. 
Otto, Feasibility Study on the Establishment of a European Civil Peace Corps, (Channel Research, 29 
November 2005); Gourlay, C., Feasibility Study on the European Civil Peace Corps, (Brussels: 
International Security Information Service, 2004). 
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5. From Democracy to Omnicracy 
The conception of power described above has the potential to project the EU as civilian 
power. Yet, the EU suffers from a long-lasting democratic deficit, and there is no 
demos. Further, the quality of a European democracy is in danger or at least in crisis 
(Papadopoulos, 2013). How does our framework deal with these problems? 
Nonviolence does not require the formation of the EU demos. The power of the 
European citizens is immense exactly because they are different. The issue is how we 
might best differ not against one another, but for one another (Wang, 2013). Thus, no 
demos: a pre-political community sharing a certain culture, language, traditions and 
symbols is not a necessary condition. Citizens don’t have to share the same political 
institutions. Yet, at the same time, no demoi: the relationship changes the different 
parts, the different demoi, which in a nonviolent turn begin working closely, with and 
for one another. Nonviolence does not unify demoi with an alternative rigid doctrine.  
Let us demonstrate these claims step by step, starting from nonviolent practice to 
support democratic institutions and to ‘democratise democracy’. At the very least, 
nonviolence provides a suite of tactics and strategies to protect democracy from the 
return to authoritarian regimes as well as from the deterioration of democracy. With the 
danger of illiberal models of democracy in Eastern Europe (Zakaria, 1997), it is  vital to 
have nonviolent capacity and know-how to act. In extreme cases of democratic danger, 
civil disobedience is the ‘revolutionary moment’ counting on the moral obligation to 
disobey to unjust laws. Further, nonviolence provides a menu of collective action when 
there is a coup d’état (Sharp and Jenkins, 2003; Taylor, 2011), and even when 
subversive criminal organisations are dominating, such as the Mafia in Italy (Beyerle, 
2014).  
Civil disobedience actually improves the quality of democracy when directed against 
well-defined cases of grave injustice (Rawls, 1971). Thus, civil disobedience is one of 
the “stabilising devices of a constitutional system” (Rawls, 1971: 383); it is the “Litmus 
test for the appropriate understanding of the moral foundations of democracy” 
(Habermas, 1985: 101).  When there is strong disagreement, civil disobedience may 
empower citizens as ‘guardians of legitimacy’ against ‘authoritarian legalism’ and any 
abuse of the majority principle. This translates, for instance, in the many grassroots 
movements against corruption we have observed (Beyerle, 2014). 
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Beyond techniques and repertoires of action, nonviolence is also a framework of action, 
a praxis, which shapes and invents new social and political practices. These practices 
make up nonviolent citizenship. This is important when dealing with the debates 
concerning the EU democratic deficit. Yet again, nonviolence allows us to look at the 
issue from a different perspective. Here, the key is not one of citizenship as status, but 
one of quality (of citizenship), following Tully’s argument that nonviolence brings 
‘diverse citizenship’ (Tully, 2008). Rights are corroborated, enacted by a praxis of, 
following Gandhi this time, sarvodaya – which means ‘the uplift of all’. 
To overcome the EU democratic deficit then, legal rights are only one dimension. When 
observed through the framework of nonviolence, the deficit does not lie in rules and 
institutions; it lies in practices. We have seen a response to the deficit with nonviolent 
practices emerging in core areas of democratic life, such as education (Wang, 2013) 
health (Alter, 1996), economics (Ghosh, 2012; Schumacher, 1993) and science6.  
This praxis is not destructive towards existing institutions, but it is definitely the reason 
for continuous reform, even radical change. Taking political parties as an example, the 
re-construction of democratic quality means radical critiques, such as Weil’s On the 
Abolition of all Political Parties, but also innovative experiments in political 
accountability, such as the ‘anti-political politics’ of Konrad and Havel in the East, 
leading to civic forums. Socially-grounded associations like the COS (Centres for 
Social Orientation) organised by Capitini (Capitini, 1950; Capitini, 1999) prefigured, in 
the 1950s, open popular assemblies organised to discuss administrative, political and 
social problems. Other examples of radical institutional change is the formation of 
nonviolent parties, such as the German Green of Petra Kelly (Kelly, 2001) and the 
Radical Party of Marco Pannella and Emma Bonino (Radaelli and Dossi, 2012); and 
arguably innovations in direct democracy (Hessel, 2010).   
The result of such diverse citizenship, of the praxis of nonviolence, is the creation de 
facto, in the actions (behaviour and practices) of everybody, of the Omni - The issue is 
not whether there is a demos or many demoi, but whether there is an action of openness 
or of closure. In this action, EU citizens are building up a new reality; these practices 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 On the relationship between nonviolence and science, the reference is The Seville Statement on 
Violence, http://www.unesco.org/cpp/uk/declarations/seville.pdf (last accessed on the 26 September 
2016). 
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represent the power of everybody, of the omni7. At its roots, this is an infinitely 
inclusive project. For this reason Aldo Capitini called this democratic project 
omnicracy, the power of all (Capitini, 1999).  
 
6. A Nonviolent Narrative for Europe 
In this section we deal with the contribution of nonviolence to the EU narrative. Some 
elements of this contribution emerge from our previous discussion of the force of 
civilian power and the new perspective on democracy. There are already foundations of 
a new narrative. But we must now elaborate more systematically. A narrative has 
structural elements (the chronology, the actors and the plot) as well as a dimension 
concerning identity (Manners and Murray, 2016): we shall deal with both in this section. 
At the outset, consider the current political debate in Europe – we will move to the 
scholarly literature in a minute. Politicians and parties are divided among those who 
appeal to national identity and those who search for a common identity, history, and, 
arguably, religious foundation for European integration. Perhaps the most visible 
moment in this controversy was in the early 2000s when politicians debated whether the 
European constitution should include references to Christianity. Nationalism misses the 
point that integration cannot simply be the domain of international diplomacy and that 
sovereignty is conditional in an inter-dependent world. Yet it is wrong to think about the 
EU as a big state. It is this wrong state-morphic vision of the EU (Majone, 1996) that 
leads us to assume that the fuel of European integration ought to be culture, history or 
religion – or a blend of the three, in the name of a European narrative supposedly 
supporting the emerging ‘European identity’. Strong federal projects are based on 
political values and rules, not on assumptions about culture and history. Nonviolence 
allows us to develop a narrative for Europe that is not state-morphic because it does not 
replicate the assumptions about history, culture and religion that ground nation-states in 
their identities. 
To support this claim, we need arguments from the academic debate. In the literature, a 
prominent theme is the narrative of Europe as a peace project (Birchfield et al., 2017). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Here we turn upside-down People’s Europe as outlined in the latest State of the Union Speech. Indeed, 
Nonviolent Europe does not start from the rights (provisions of workers and workplace rights), and in 
particular it does not conceive of citizenship as a status. The key is to empower a new praxis, a citizenship 
not by stealth but by action.  
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There are studies that evaluate to what extent this has been true, both externally 
(Lavenex, 2017; Ludlow, 2017) and internally. Yet, this (perhaps temporary) success is 
already showing cracks: the purpose of the EU is becoming less and less intelligible to 
younger generations, and it is less and less persuasive. 
Where do we look for the ‘People’s Europe’, recently re-launched in the latest State of 
the Union address? Another strand of the literature points to the political effects of 
narratives (Manners and Murray, 2016). Interestingly, in their analysis of EU narratives, 
Manners and Murray argue that the chronicle of the EU as a peace project is obsolete.  
Hence the challenge for ‘Nonviolent Europe’ is: can this narrative go further than a 
peace project? Let us proceed step by step. To begin with structural elements, a 
nonviolent narrative connects liberation from totalitarian regimes across European 
nations and at different times in history - from Germany to Poland, from Portugal to 
Lithuania. It can be also connected with the efforts to find stable conflict resolution in 
the wake of the fall of Communism and in troubled areas, as shown by the conflicts in 
former Yugoslavia. An important dimension of this narrative structure is that its end 
point is not an EU super-state with its own identity cancelling out national identities. 
This kind of Europeanism is bound to be limited to the minority, it will never gain the 
support of a broad and consistent number of EU citizens. 
The nonviolent narrative actually proceeds from the individual and their relationship 
with the other – karma yoga being about the consequences of an action for others, for 
the community, the environment, sentient creatures and so on. In this narrative, 
governance emerges from individual responsibility, not from a finalité. On this 
dimension of the ‘end point’, nonviolence does much less than the other narratives 
proposed by ardent Europeanists – from Altiero Spinelli to Jacques Delors. Yet – we 
argue – it achieves more. 
To see this, we turn to narrative identity, Nonviolent Europe is not the narrative of 
small elites. It can be embraced by people of different ages and backgrounds. Memories 
of champions of this transnational vision, always rooted in individual liberation (not in 
the EU super-state) should be cultivated by educational projects. Among these 
champions we find politicians, as well as exemplary figures of civil society. We 
mention in no particular order Jagerstetter, Palach, Havel, Walesa, Don Tonino Bello, 
Kelly, Pannella and Capitini.  
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These models along with the legacy of techniques, actions, practices and spontaneous 
experiments which are still developing across Europe, constitute a widespread basis on 
which such a narrative can further develop. It may include some of the recent 
movements formed during the crisis – and leaderless movements of course, where the 
meaning of collective action, not the leader, ‘is’ the message. The narrative – we submit 
– also embraces episodes and movements that flourished and are still blossoming 
outside the EU. Lego toys used to protest in Siberia against the Russian authority are 
seen as fastidious by the Russian regime, because they cannot incarcerate toys (Popovic, 
2015: 119; O'Flynn, 2012)8, but… imagine they are celebrated with an exhibition at the 
European Parliament! These forms of narrative engagement are already quite 
widespread and diversified within the EU and beyond, they need to be publicly 
embraced and celebrated. 
Finally, the narrative offered by nonviolence offers a precise picture of how change 
happens.  Indeed, one of the key and long-lasting points of the nonviolent narrative is 
the equation between means and ends. Yet, what does it mean exactly? Gandhi brought 
to the fore a new approach to the dyad of means/ends, which is critical for a new 
European narrative. Instead of drawing normative guidelines from existing beliefs and 
constraints, resulting therefore in conservative actions, Gandhian realism starts from 
reality (Mantena, 2012a: 462). What is becomes the more suitable means for an end. 
Hence ‘what is’ becomes a description linked to an action and its purpose. It is still a 
description, based on what actually happens around us, but it opens us a process  where 
change becomes feasible. Similarly, what ought to be starts by pursuing one end 
through the right action, on the basis of the best description of reality possible 
(Mantena, 2012a). In other words, the ends are the consequences, and not general and 
abstract ideas to implement.   
 
7. Conclusion: Towards a nonviolent research agenda 
The European project is facing a compound crisis of power, democracy, and narrative. 
We have argued that nonviolence provides an analytical and normative framework to 
address these problems. Admittedly, ours is only a sketch, a presentation of 
nonviolence. For this reason we adopted the notion of framework rather than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/15/toys-protest-not-citizens-russia  
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‘theoretical perspective’ or ‘theory’. Yet this framework has potential for the EU and for 
EU studies. The lessons drawn are in fact as important for those involved in politics as 
they are for those who define the research agendas of the next stage of EU studies. 
Concerning power, the current attention towards external impediments to EU action in 
the world and the military overshadows the potential of citizens freed from internal 
impediments to forge a civilian power, bringing Duchêne and Manners’s intuitions to 
their natural conclusion. Concerning the democratic deficit, the obsession with 
institutional issues and cultural-linguistic differences overshadows the opportunity to 
democratise the EU via day-to-day praxis and take the first steps towards the goal of 
omni-cracy. Interestingly, these steps do not presuppose a state-morphic notion of the 
EU, hence they are not entangled with the questions of whether the EU should become a 
confederation, a federation or a super-state. Finally, nonviolence is the springboard for a 
narrative linking past and future, models from different backgrounds and contexts, as 
well as ‘is’ and ‘ought to’ with a different account of change.   
This project does not require billions from the EU budget. Yet it would garner the 
mobilisation potential released by EU citizens during the crisis in their spontaneous 
search for change and responses to problems of democratic quality and governance. 
Further research is needed on how to assemble and scale up the empirical 
manifestations of nonviolence that we have documented, hopefully in the direction of a 
nonviolent theory of integration. At the moment, we cannot compare our sketch of a 
research agenda with fully-fledged theories. It is too early. All we can say today is that 
nonviolence has an affinity with social constructivism in that it sees ontology as 
foundational. It also has a family resemblance with the dissenting theories recently 
illustrated in JCMS (54/1), most likely those arguing for a practice turn (Adler-Nissen, 
2016). But to carry on with this, we need first to establish whether a nonviolent theory 
of the EU is possible and makes sense. This is an attractive agenda for future research in 
this field. 
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